Right to Speedy Trial:  The Constitutional Right and Its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 by Steinberg, Marc I,
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 66 | Issue 3 Article 1
1976
Right to Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right
and Its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
Marc I, Steinberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Marc I, Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The Constitutional Right and Its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 229 (1975)
THE JOURNAL OF CRINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 66, No. S
Copyright (C 1975 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
CRIMINAL LAW
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE SPEEDY
TRIAL ACT OF 1974
MARC I. STEINBERG*
INTRODUCTION
The right to a speedy trial in a criminal
prosecution is one of the most basic rights pre-
served by the United States Constitution.' In
Klopfer v. North Carolina, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized the significance of
this guarantee by holding that the right to a
speedy trial "is as fundamental as any of the
rights secured by the Sixth Amendment." 3
This sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is
made applicable to and enforceable against the
states by virtue of the due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment.4
The speedy trial guarantee fulfills several
purposes for the individual defendant. First,
the guarantee enhances the integrity of the
fact-finding process by making it more likely
that evidence and memories of witnesses will
remain readily available. 5 Second, the right
minimizes the infliction of anxiety upon the
defendant caused by long-pending charges and
prevents prolonged pre-trial incarceration. 6
* A.B., The University of Michigan; J.D., Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles.
The Journal wishes to acknowledge the editorial
assistance rendered by James F. Gossett in prepar-
ing this article for publication.
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . ." The author has
dealt with the federal constitutional speedy trial
issue in a previous article: Steinberg, Right to
Speedy Trial: Maintaining a Proper Balance Be-
tween the Interests of Society and the Rights of
the Accused, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAsxA L. Rnv. 242
(1974). Certain portions of the following discus-
sion on the constitutional guarantee were pub-
lished, in an entirely different context, in that re-
view.
2 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
3 Id. at 223.
4 Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374-75 (1969);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
5 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966).
6 Id.
Third, the guarantee guards against oppres-
sive conduct on the part of public officials who
may intentionally withhold a criminal trial.7
The public also is entitled to a speedy trial
in a criminal prosecution, as Chief Justice
Burger recently observed.8 He contended that
the deterrent goals of the criminal law are in-
adequately served when the defendant is de-
prived of this right.9 Justice Brennan, concur-
ring in Dickey v. Florida,20 noted that delay
may hinder the government in proving its case
and concluded that the right to a speedy trial
protects both the public and the defendant be-
cause "the guarantee protects our common in-
terest that government prosecute, not perse-
cute, those whom it accuses of crime." "I
In order to more effectively implement the
interests of both society and the accused, Con-
gress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.12
This Act represents affirmative congressional
action in a stated attempt to reduce crime and
7 Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946, 956
(Alaska 1971) (Connor & Rabinowitz, J.J., dis-
senting in part). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 532 (1972), the Court stated that the most
serious interest of the accused protected by the
speedy trial right is the one first mentioned above
because "the inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system."
8 Burger, The State of the Jidiciary-1970, 56
A.B.A.J. 929, 932 (1970).9 Id. at 931-32. In 1970 Chief Justice Burger
strongly supported legislative action which would
provide a remedy to try defendants within sixty
days after indictment. He predicted that this prac-
tice "would sharply reduce the crime rate." Most
recently, however, he has voiced the concern of
the Judicial Conference of the United States that
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 may pose difficult
problems for the federal judiciary. See Burger,
The State of the Judiciary-1975, 61 A.B.A.J. 439,
442-43 (1975) ; note 74 infra.
10 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
11 Id. at 42-43 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (Supp. 1975).
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the danger of recidivism in this country and
contains provisions strengthening the supervi-
sion over persons released pending trial.13 The
Act also seeks more stringently to safeguard
the sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee by
establishing time limits within which an ac-
cused must be brought to trial.14 In passing
the Speedy Trial Act, Congress specifically de-
termined that neither the previous decisions of
the Supreme Court nor the implementation of
rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure had provided the courts with ade-
quate guidance on the speedy trial question.1 5
Under rule 50(b), the district courts have de-
veloped plans "for the prompt disposition of
criminal cases" within their districts, some
based on a model plan -prepared by the Ad-
ministrative Office."- When viewed in its en-
tirety, the Speedy Trial Act is a highly com-
mendable piece of legislation. It is submitted,
however, that the Act contains one basic flaw.
That weakness is that the time period to meas-
ure whether the accused has been denied his
speedy trial guarantee does not begin to run
until he is arrested or served with a summons.'
7
It is submitted that this provision deprives both
the accused and society of many of the benefits
which the Act allegedly confers.
This article shall first examine the minimum
constitutional standards which must be main-
tained in, order to secure the defendant his
right to a speedy trial. Next, the pertinent pro-
visions of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 will be
discussed and compared with the minimum
safeguards required by the Constitution. Last,
this article will examine the issue of when the
speedy trial time period should attach in order
13 Id.
14 16 BNA CR. L. REP 2309 (January 8, 1975).
The limitations on trial delay apparently were con-
sidered by Congress partly as a means of reducing
crime and recidivism. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7402, 7408-09.
15 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7404-05.
16 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7405-06.
The primary drawback Congress found with the
plans drawn up under rule 50(b) was that they
encouraged the perpetuation of the status quo
through their leniency. Id.
17 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b). This section provides in
pertinent part that an information or indictment
"charging an individual with the commission of an
offense shall be filed within thirty days from the
date on which such individual was arrested or
served with a summons in connection with such
charges."
to better promote the interests of both society
and the accused.
I. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
In determining the minimum constitutional
safeguards which must be protected in order to
assure the defendant his right to a speedy trial,
the fact appears that although this right is pro-
vided for by the sixth amendment to the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court has dealt with
this guarantee only infrequently.' s In Strunk
v. United States, 9 the Court held that the sole
constitutional remedy for a denial of the right
to speedy trial was dismissal of the charges.
Prior to the recent case of Barker v. Wingo,
20
however, the Court had never even attempted
to establish the standards by which the speedy
trial guarantee is to be judged.
21
In Barker, the Supreme Court took the ap-
proach that the speedy trial right must be en-
forced by balancing the actions of the prosecu-
tion and the accused against one another on an
ad hoc basis. 22 The Court identified four
factors that courts should assess in deciding
whether the accused has been deprived of his
right to a speedy trial: "Length of delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion
's See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352
U.S. 354, 361 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198
U.S. 77, 87 (1905). The right to a speedy trial
has also been secured by the constitutions of the
various states. For this reason, as well as because
of the Supreme Court's mandate in Klopfer, more
than thirty-five states have enacted, either by
court rule or by statute, provisions to alleviate
pretrial delay in criminal cases. 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7402. Along with the lower
federal courts, many of which have promulgated
rules designed to provide speedy trials, the states
present a contrast to the Supreme Court in the
frequency with which they have dealt with speedy
trial issues. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 7405-06.
19412 U.S. 434 (1973).
20 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
21 Id. at 516. Prior to Barker, the Supreme
Court had rarely dealt with the speedy trial guar-
antee at any length. The cases largely concerned
tangential issues. Yet dicta in these holdings were
relied on by courts seeking to restrict the right to
a speedy trial. For a detailed analysis see Note,
The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L.
REv. 1587 (1965).
22 407 U.S. at 530. For a good discussion on the
balancing test see Comment, Devitalization of the
Right to a Speedy Trial: The "Per Case" Method
v. The "Per Se" Theory, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 106,
111-14 (1973).
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of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." 2
3
The Court emphasized that none of these four
factors is sufficient alone to support a finding
that the accused was deprived of his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial. Rather, all of the
above factors are interrelated and must be con-
sidered together.
2 4
Concerning the length of permissible delay,
the Supreme Court concluded that there is "no
constitutional basis for holding that the speedy
trial right can be quantified into a specified
number of days or months." 25 The Court
noted that the right to a speedy trial is less
clearly defined than other procedural guaran-
tees, and consequently it is difficult to deter-
mine with exactness when the right has been
denied.2 r For that reason, whether delay has
been prejudicial to the defendant's right to a
speedy trial is dependent upon the particular
facts and circumstances of each case.
2 7
In discussing possible excuses for delay, the
Court held that different weights should be al-
located to different sources of delay. A deliber-
ate effort to delay the trial in an attempt to in-
jure the defense should be counted heavily
against the government.28 A less blameworthy
reason such as negligence or overcrowded cal-
endars should be counted less heavily.2 9 Fi-
nally, a justifiable reason, such as a missing
23 407 U.S. at 530. See Godbold, Speedy Trial
-Major Surgery For A National Ill, 24 ALA. L.
REv. 265, 274-88 (1972). In his article, Judge
Godbold thoroughly examines each of these four
factors and the importance that should be given to
each in determining whether the defendant has
been denied his speedy trial guarantee.
24 407 U.S. at 533.
25 Id. at 523. This is a separate question from
that of whether a defendant's right to speedy trial
should be quantified specifically for policy reasons.
See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEmY TRiAL
§ 2.1, at 14-16, Comment (Approved Draft 1970).
26 407 U.S. at 521.
27 Id. at 530-31.
2S Id. at 531. See United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971) (no prejudice alleged-
no showing of intentional delay) ; Pollard v. United
States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (delay not inten-
tional or oppressive).
29 407 U.S. at 531. See Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973). The recent case of
United States v. Roemer, 514 F2d 1377 (2d Cir.
1975), provides an excellent example of negligent
delay. In that case, a 56-month post-indictment
and pre-trial delay was upheld. The kind of delay
sanctioned in Roemer has often been allowed in
federal and state courts, especially when, as in
Roemer, the accused has failed to show that preju-
dice resulted from the delay.
material witness, should be considered an
appropriate basis for a delay and should not,
therefore, be weighed against the government.30
Concerning the defendant's assertion of his
right, the Court rejected the concept that a de-
fendant waives his right to a speedy trial for
all periods prior to which such defendant has
not demanded a speedy trial.31 The Court rea-
soned that the right to a speedy trial, like all
fundamental constitutional rights, cannot be
presumptively waived.32 However, the Court
did adopt the rule that the defendant's failure
to demand his right to a speedy trial is a rele-
vant factor to be considered in determining
whether he has been deprived of this right.33
The Court emphasized that "failure to assert
the right will make it difficult for a defendant
to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." 34
30407 U.S. at 531. The states and lower federal
courts have for years recognized that certain rea-
sons for delay are justifiable. If delay is occa-
sioned by the fault of the accused himself, for
example, as when he deliberately evades arrest, it
has generally been held that he cannot challenge
that delay as violating any right he may have to a
speedy trial. See e.g., United States v. Morris, 308
F. Supp. 1348 (D.C. Pa. 1970) ; State v Harring-
ton, 92 Idaho 317, 442 P.2d 453 (1968).
33-407 U.S. at 525. Prior to Barker, one of the
leading federal cases which adopted the "demand-
waiver doctrine" was United States v. Lustman,
258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
880 (1958). For a good analysis of the doctrine see
Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57
COLUm. L. REv. 846, 852-55 (1957).
32 407 U.S. at 525.
33 Id. at 528.
34Id. at 532. Several appellate decisions in fed-
eral and state courts had required the defendant to
demand trial in order to commence the time run-
ning under various speedy trial statutes despite the
fact that most speedy trial acts are silent on the
question. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 326 (1958);
Annot., 129 A.L.R. 572, 587 (1940).
A strong minority [of appellate cases], how-
ever, rejects the "demand doctrine" and re-
quires only a motion to dismiss filed before
trial. These courts place the duty of procuring
prompt trial upon the state, attributing signifi-
cance to the fact that only the state is empow-
ered to bring the charge to trial. Forcing de-
fendant to press for speedy trial would,
according to this view, enable the state to do
nothing until defendant acts, and then, if he
acts too late, to claim waiver.
Note, The Right to a Speedy Criinal Trial, 57
CoLum. L. REv. 846, 853 (1957). See also id. at
852-55.
The American Bar Association, in setting its
minimum standards relating to speedy trial, also




The Court also noted that prejudice to the
defendant should be assessed in reference to
the interests of the accused which the speedy
trial clause is designed to protect.
3 5 If wit-
nesses die or otherwise become unavailable
during a delay, the prejudice is clear. And the
same is true if defense witnesses are unable to
remember accurately events of the distant
past. 36 Prejudice also occurs through pro-
longed pre-trial incarceration. The Court ob-
served that time spent in jail by a person not
yet found guilty impairs the defendant's ability
to contact witnesses, accumulate evidence, or
otherwise prepare his defense.37 Finally, even
if the defendant is not imprisoned prior to
trial, he still suffers great anxiety by being
subjected to restraints upon his freedom and to
public suspicion.38
Under the balancing test, as promulgated in
Barker, none of the above four factors-length
of the delay, cause of the delay, assertion of
the right, and prejudice to the defendant-is
sufficient alone to find that the accused was de-
prived of his federal constitutional right to a
speedy trial. Rather, these four factors are in-
terrelated and must be considered together in
One reason for this position is that there are
a number of situations, such as where the de-
fendant is unaware of the charge or where the
defendant is without counsel, in which it is
unfair to require a demand .... Jurisdictions
with a demand requirement are faced with the
continuing problem of defining exceptions, a
process which has not always been carried out
with uniformity. . . . More important, the
demand requirement is inconsistent with the
public interest in prompt disposition of crimi-
nal cases. Consistent with the policies ex-
pressed in Part I of these standards, the trial
of a criminal case should not be unreasonably
delayed merely because the defendant does not
think that it is in his best interest to seek
prompt disposition of the charge.
ABA, supra note 25. The ABA standards do estab-
lish special procedures for those cases in which the
person charged with a crime is imprisoned for an-
other offense. In those cases, according to the
standards, the prosecutor should not proceed to
trial unless the prisoner makes a demand since the
prisoner should have the option of not making the
demand in the hope the charges will be dropped
before or at the time he completes his sentence.
Id. § 2.2, at 17, Comment at 18.
s5 407 U.S. at 532. See text accompanying notes
5-7 .rupra.
36 407 U.S. at 532.
37 Id. at 532-33.
38 Id. at 533.
determining whether the federal speedy trial
right has been abridged.
II. THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
The Speedy Trial Act of 197439 must meet
the minimum constitutional standards estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court.
Provided that these minimum standards are
met, the Congress is free to expand this guar-
antee so as to provide greater protection for
the individual defendant.
40
The Act clearly exceeds the minimum con-
stitutional requirements. First, it provides for a
definitive time period within which the defend-
ant must be brought to trial. In establishing this
time period, the Act states that an information
or indictment charging an accused with the
commission of a crime must be filed within
thirty days from the time of arrest or from the
time that he was served with a summons.
4'
The arraignment must then be held within ten
days from the time of the information or
indictment. 42 Upon a plea of not guilty, the
trial must then be held within sixty days after
arraignment. Hence, from the date of his ar-
rest, the defendant must be brought to trial
within 100 days.
43
39 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (Supp. 1975).
40 See generally Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,
374-75 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
4118 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b).4 2 Id. § 3161(c).
43 Id. It is interesting to note that some states
have already enacted statutes which establish a
definitive time limit within which the defendant
must be brought to trial. See e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1382 (West 1970) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 103-05(a) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 795.1,
795.2 (Supp. 1975); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 277,
§ 72 (Supp. 1975) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781
(Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 10.37.020,
10.46.010 (Supp. 1975). The California statute al-
lows fifteen days from the time a felony defendant
is held to answer to the filing of the information,
and a time period of sixty days from the informa-
tion to the trial. A shorter period is established for
misdemeanors. The Illinois act allows a time period
of 120 days between arrest and trial. The Iowa
statute provides for a thirty-day limit from the date
the accused is held to answer until indictment and a
sixty-day limit from indictment to trial. The Mass-
achusetts law contains a six-month limit from time
of imprisonment or bail. The Pennsylvania law pro-
vides for a six-month period from the date of com-
mitment. The Washington statute sets a limit at
thirty days from the date the accused is held to_
answer till indictment or filing of an information.
The model plan now in effect in many federal dis-
trict courts provides for a twenty-day and thirty-day
[Vol. 66
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To enable the federal courts to fully comply
with these time -periods, the Act will take effect
over a gradual period. During the first year
after the Act takes effect, the maximum time
limit between arrest and indictment is sixty
days. For the second year, it is forty-five days
and for the third year, thirty-five day& The
maximum time limit between arraignment and
trial is 180 days for the first year, 120 days for
the second year, and eighty days for the third
year.4 5 In the event that any federal court is
unable to comply with the Act due to the posi-
tion of its court calendar, the chief judge may
under certain conditions apply for a suspension
of such time periods,4 6 provided that the sus-
pension does not exceed one year.47 Any addi-
tional suspensions cannot be granted without
congressional approval.48 In addition, none of
the above time limitations will take effect until
"on or after the date of expiration of the
twelve-calendar-month period following July 1,
1975." 49 Congress, however, has provided an
interim plan to commence ninety days after
July 1, 1975, and terminating on the date im-
mediately preceding the expiration of the
above twelve-calendar-month period.50 The in-
terim plan provides that in regard to detained
persons who are incarcerated solely because
they cannot pay bail51 and to released persons
who are awaiting trial and are considered as
being of high risk,5 2 the trial of such persons
shall be held within ninety days following the
commencement of such continuous detention or
period respectively between indictment and arraign-
ment for defendants in custody or released prior to
trial. Between arraignment and entry of a guilty
plea for defendants in custody is a period of ninety
days and for other defendants a period of 180 days.
Thereafter the sentencing of a defendant must take
place within forty-five days.
44 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (f).
45 Id. § 3161(g).
46 Id. § 3174(a). Before applying for a suspen-
sion of these time periods, the chief judge and the
planning group must be satisfied that the resources
of the district court in question "are being
efficiently utilized."
47Id. § 3174(b). Before granting such a sus-
pension, all relevant parties must conclude that "no
remedy for such congestion is reasonably avail-
able."
48 Id. § 3174(c).
49 Id. § 3163 (a) (1) (b) (1).
5d. § 3164(a).
51 Id. § 3164(a) (1).52Id. § 3164(a) (2).
designation of high risk.53 Hence, although the
ultimate aim of the Act is to require that the
accused be brought to trial within 100 days
after arrest, it will probably take the federal
courts five years to achieve this goal.
In determining whether the accused has been
denied his statutory right to a speedy trial, the
Act provides for a number of delay periods
which are to be excluded in computing the rel-
evant time limit.5 4 These delays are thus
deemed justifiable within the terms of the Act.
They include, but are not limited to, periods of
delay resulting from other proceedings regard-
ing the defendant; 55 delays requested by the
government and consented to by the accused,
with the approval of the court, "for the pur-
pose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate
his good conduct" ;5s delays caused by the ab-
sence or unavailability of the accused or an es-
sential witness ,7 delays resulting from the de-
fendant's mental or physical incompetency to
stand trial;58 and delays resulting from the
SId. § 3164(b). In the event that trial is not
held within ninety days, § 3164(c) provides that if
the delay was not caused by the defendant or his
counsel and if such defendant is still incarcerated
because he cannot make bail, then he must be re-
leased pending trial. If, however, a defendant is
released and is designated as being of high risk,
an intentional delay on his part will prompt the
court to reconsider the conditions of his release in
order to insure his appearance at trial.
541d. § 3161(h). For an interesting compari-
son see People v. Stillman, 391 Ill. 227, 62 N.E2d
698 (1945), holding that when the defendant ob-
tains a continuance, the 120-day Illinois statute of
limitations begins running anew from the end of the
continuance.
551d. § 3161(h)(1). Such other proceedings
involving the defendant include trials relating to
other charges against the accused, interlocutory
appeals, hearings on pretrial motions, and exami-
nations and hearings concerning his mental compe-
tency or physical incapacity.
56 Id. § 3161(h) (2).
57 Id. § 3161(h) (3) (A). In defining the mean-
ing of absence or unavailability, § 3161(h) (3) (B)
states:
For purposes of subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph, a defendant or an essential witness
shall be considered absent when his where-
abouts are unknown and, in addition, he is at-
tempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution
or his whereabouts cannot be determined by
due diligence. For purposes of such subpara-
graph, a defendant or an essential witness
shall be considered unavailable whenever his
vhereabouts are known but his presence for
trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he
resists appearing at or being returned for
trial.
581d. § 3161(h) (4).
1975]
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granting of a continuance when "the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continu-
ance outweigh the best interests of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial." 59
If the time limits provided for by the Act,
excluding periods permitted by justifiable de-
lays, are not adhered to by the government,
the charges against the accused must be dis-
missed or otherwise dropped either with or
without prejudice. In the case of excessive
delay between arrest and indictment or infor-
59 Id. § 3161(h) (8) (A). In determining whether
to grant a continuance, § 3161(h) (8) (B) provides
that the court must consider, among others, the
following factors:
(i) Whether the failure to grant such a con-
tinuance in the proceeding would be likely to
make a continuation of such proceeding impos-
sible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(ii) Whether the case taken as a whole is so
unusual and so complex, due to the number of
defendants or the nature of the prosecution or
otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect ad-
equate preparation within the periods of time
established by this section.
(iii) Whether delay after the grand jury pro-
ceedings have commenced, in a case where ar-
rest precedes indictment, is caused by the unu-
sual complexity of the factual determination to
be made by thei grand jury or by events
beyond the control of the court or the Gov-
ernment.
Only a few states have attempted to enumerate
all lawful excuses for delay, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.1-191 (Supp. 1975). In these states, the most
frequently listed excuses are delay "upon the appli-
cation of the defendant", e.g, ALASKA STAT. §
1220.050(a) (3) (1972), and delay because of the
need to gather material evidence, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1711 (1964). The model plan in effect in
many federal districts now provides broad discre-
tion in the extension of time limits. 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7406. Similarly, the
American Bar Association's standards on speedy
trial list numerous excluded periods. See ABA,
supra note 25, at 25-26 & 26-32, Comment. The
following excludable periods of delay are listed in
the ABA standards and have often found support
in state and federal court opinions as well as state
statutes:
1. Delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant and incompetency
to stand trial. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 §
103-5(a) (1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
62-3-21 (1966).
2. Delay resulting from congestion of court
dockets due to exceptional circumstances.
Many states excuse delay even when
congestion of the courts is chronic. See
e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1710 (1964).
3. Delay requested or consented to by the de-
fendant.
4. Delay requested by the prosecution if mate-
rial evidence unavoidably will not be avail-
able until a later date or if other
exceptional circumstances require additional
mation, the charges are dropped automatically. 60
If the excessive delay occurs between arraign-
ment and trial, however, the indictment or
information will be dismissed only on motion
by the accused. If the defendant fails to make
this motion for dismissal before he goes on
trial or before he enters a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, he shall be deemed to have
waived this right to dismissal. 61 In determining
whether a particular case should be dismissed
with or without prejudice, the Act provides
that the court shall consider, but is not limited
to, each of the following factors: "the serious-
ness of the offense; the facts and circumstances
of the case which led to the dismissal; and the
impact of a reprosecution on the administration
of this chapter and on the administration of
justice.
62
time for the preparation of the state's case.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. § 103-5(c)
(1973) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1710 (1964).
5. Delay resulting from the absence or un-
availability of the defendant. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.1-191 (Supp. 1975). In numer-
ous cases, courts have held that circum-
stances did not justify delay when the ac-
cused was "unavailable" only because of
the negligence of authorities in failing to
pursue him, and not because of any deliber-
ate evasion on the part of the accused.
See, e.g., United States v. Kojima, 3 Ha-
waii Dist. 381 (1909) ; People v. Serio, 13
Misc. 2d 973, 181 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1958).
6. The period from a dismissal upon motion
of the prosecuting attorney and the filing
of a subsequent charge for the same of-
fense or an offense required to be joined
with it. It is felt that if dismissal by the
prosecutor were to operate so as to begin
the time running anew upon a subsequent
charge of the same offense, this would
open a way for the complete evasion of the
speedy trial guarantee. Brooks v. People,
88 Ill. 327, 330 (1878).
7. Delay resulting from joint trial with a co-
defendant as to whom the time for trial
has not run where there is not good cause
for severance. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
918.016 (1974).
60 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162(a) (1).
6 Id. § 3162(a) (2).
6 2 1d. § 3162(a) (1) (2). The consequences of a.
delay in violation of the right to speedy trial are
often inexplicit in state statutes. Some do declare
there is always a ban to subsequent prosecution,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.015 (1974). Others
make improper delay a ban only in misdemeanor
cases, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-51-6 (1953).
Some, but not all, state courts in states with am-
biguous statutes establish a ban. See, e.g., Brum-
mitt v. Higgins, 80 Okla. Crim. 183, 157 P2d 922
(1945); People v. Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384,
104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972). This is the approach
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When one compares the Speedy Trial Act with
the constitutional requirements formulated by
the Supreme Court, the following facts emerge.
First, under the Constitution, there is no defi-
nitive time period within which the defendant
must be brought to trial. 3 Under the Speedy
Trial Act, the time limit is 100 days between
arrest and trial.64 Second, the Court has con-
cluded that delays caused by negligence or
overcrowded court calendars should not be
weighed that heavily against the government. 65
Contrary to the Court's holding, the Act pro-
vides that "no continuance.., shall be granted
because of general congestion of the court's
calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or
failure to obtain available witnesses on the part
-of the attorney for the Government." 6" Third,
under the Constitution, the defendant's failure
to demand a speedy trial is an important varia-
.ble in assessing whether he has been denied
-this guarantee0 7 The Act, however, states that
the time period begins, without demand by the
:accused, once he is arrested or served with a
summons.68 The defendant can waive this stat-
utory right only by failing to move "for dis-
missal prior, to trial or entry of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere."6 9 Fourth, under
the Constitution, the factor of prejudice must
be evaluated in terms largely dealing with
whether the unjustifiable delay hampered the
defendant in the presentation of his case.70 The
constitutional standard here deters a court
taken in the ABA standards also. See ABA, supra
note 25, at 40. In contrast, the model plan provides
no sanction for the failure of a district court to
provide a speedy trial with the exception of release
from custody for deendants who are incarcerated
prior to trial. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nws
at 7406. The requirement is universally supported
by all plans for speedy trial that the defendant must
move for dismissal prior to trial or plea of guilty.
Otherwise, the right to speedy trial is waived. See,
e.g. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 336, 343 (1958);
ABA, .mpra note 25, at 41.
03 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
In Barker, the Court stated that there is "no con-
stitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial
right can be quantified into a specific number of
days or months."
64 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b) (c).
05 407 U.S. at 531; see Strunk v. United States,
412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973).
66 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h) (8) (C).
07 407 U.S. at 528.
68 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b).
69Id. § 3162(a) (2).
70 407 U.S. at 532.
from holding that the defendant was denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, for by so
holding, the state is forever barred from repros-
ecuting the accused on that charge. The Act
however, gives the court discretionary power
to dismiss the case either with or without
prejudice.71 Because the defendant's remedy is
not so drastic, the court can dismiss without
prejudice by the state's mere noncompliance
with the Act, whether that noncompliance was
with good or bad intentions -.7 2 When dismissal
is with prejudice, however, the Act provides
that the court examine the same type of factors
which are constitutionally mandated in
Barker.
73
From the above discussion, it may fairly be
concluded that the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
meets and exceeds the minimum constitutional
requirements established by the United States
Supreme Court. There remains, however, one
major gap in the federal legislation which needs
to be corrected. That problem is determining
the proper time in which the defendant's right
to a speedy trial should attach.
7 4
71 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162(a) (1) (2).
7
2 Id. The Act provides that if the time" limits
are not adhered to, and if there are no justifiable
delays or a waiver on the defendant's part, the
court must dismiss the charges. The only discre-
tionary matter for the judge is to dismiss with or
without prejudice.
7aSee 407 U.S. at 528-33; 18 U.S.C.A. §
3162(a) (1) (2).
74 Other criticisms have been leveled at the
Speedy Trial Act. Chief Justice Burger and the
majority of judges in the Judicial Conference of
the United States disapproved the Act because they
thought that it was unnecessary to supplant the
rule 50(b) plans and because they anticipated a
crisis in the courts resulting from the Act unless
more federal judges were appointed and more
money appropriated for the courts. See Burger,
The State of the udiciary-1975, 61 A.B.A.J. 439,
442-43 (1975). Convincing testimony by other
federal judges was presented to the Congress,
however, indicating that because of the phase-in
provisions of the Speedy Trial Act there would be
no problem for the federal judiciary in meeting
the Act's time limits even without additional re-
sources, personnel and facilities. 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 7407. Regarding the conten-
tion that the rule 50(b) plans were effective, the
Congress found to the contrary. See note 16 supra.
Another criticism made of the Speedy Trial Act
is that its mandatory dismissal provisions will
allow persons posing a danger to the public to be
released and will undermine the public's faith in
the criminal justice system. 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 7447. Nevertheless, it has been held
in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973),
19751
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III. TaE TIME PERIOD ATTACHMENT ISSUE
Although the defendant is afforded various
safeguards under both the constitutional right
to a speedy trial and the Speedy Trial Act of
1974, the question persists as to when the de-
fendant has access to these safeguards.7 5 The
Speedy Trial Act provides that the time limit
shall commence when the defendant is "ar-
rested or served with a summons in connection
with such charges." 76 If the accused is neither
arrested nor served with a summons prior to
the issuance of an information or indictment
against him, the time period shall begin upon
the filing of such information or indictment.
77
that the sole remedy for a denial of the constitu-
tional speedy trial right is dismissal. This and a
complete discharge from later prosecution are also
the only effective remedy.
It is also said that short time limits in the Act
will discourage prosecutors from bringing compli-
cated cases. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
7447. However, the Government has no reason to
doubt the courts' ability to reach just solutions
through use of the Act's continuance provisions.
Another criticism of the act is that it will result
in a decrease in guilty pleas, which are necessary
if the courts are not to be overloaded with work.
Id. Apart from the questionable desirability of re-
taining the guilty plea as a part of our system of
justice, there is evidence in the experience of the
Second Circuit with its speedy trial plan that
guilty pleas may even be increased under the Act.
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7450.
Finally, the argument is made that the Speedy
Trial Act, regardless of when the right to a
speedy trial attaches under it, deals with only part
of the problem of delay in our criminal justice
system. See Taylor, The Long Wait for a Speedy
Trial, 80 CASE & Com. 3 (1975), for a fine expo-
sition of the over-all problem. Many of the re-
forms that will be necessary if the problem is to
be solved, however, would be better attacked by
some means other than speedy trial legislation.
Delay in sentencing, for example, can hardly be
assaulted under the right of speedy trial of an act
implementing it. It can only yield to a due process
argument. See Erbe v. State, 25 Md. App. 375, 336
A.2d 129 (1975).
75 The author has stated substantial portions of
the following discussion in a previous article.
Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: Maintaining a
Proper Balance Between the Interests of Society
and the Rights of the Accused, 4 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. Ray. 242, 254-60 (1974).
76 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b).
77 Id. § 3161(c). The provisions of the Speedy
Trial Act dealing with the attachment of the
speedy trial time period follow generally the pro-
cedures adopted in the majority of states that have
dealt with the question. See, State v. Almeida, 54
Hawaii 443, 509 P.2d 549 (1973) : Note The Riaht
In United States v. Marion,78 in which three
years passed between the commission of the al-
leged crime and the filing of the indictment,
the Supreme Court held that the particular
protections guaranteed by the speedy trial
clause of the sixth amendment only take effect
upon "either a formal indictment or informa-
tion or else the actual restraints imposed by
arrest and holding to answer a criminal
charge. . . ." 79 In a separate concurring opin-
ion,80 Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, argued that the time period
should attach when the prosecution acquires
sufficient evidence to bring charges against the
accused."'
It is submitted that the argument proposed
by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall in
Marion deserves serious consideration.8 2 Al-
though delays prior to arrest or indictment do
not usually subject the prospective defendant
to incarceration, anxiety, or public accusation,
such delays may impair the ability of the ac-
cused to defend himself.83 When an individual
has been formally accused of a specific offense,
he is aware of the charges against him and
may proceed to prepare his defense.8 4 Where
the prospective defendant has not been for-
mally charged, however, he may be unaware
that criminal charges will subsequently be
to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoLum. L. Rav. 846,
847 (1957). The American Bar Association stand-
ards for speedy trial also follow the majority rule.
See ABA, sipra note 25, at 16-17 & 17-23, Com-
ment. The model plan, in contrast, provides that
various speedy trial time limits attach at arraign-
ment and indictment. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai.
NEws 7406.
78 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
79 Id. at 320.
so Id. at 326, 334-35. In Marion, the defendants
were charged with conducting a fraudulent busi-
ness which involved misrepresentations, alterations
of contracts, and intentional nonperformance of
contracts. Because the crime included vast inter-
state aspects, the victims were widely dispersed
and difficult to locate. Because these extenuating
circumstances made it difficult for the government
to prosecute, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the result by
holding that the three year period did not violate
the defendants' right to a speedy trial.
8 Id. at 330-31 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., concurring); United
States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585, 587 (D.
Alaska 1970).
84 Cf. 319 F. Supp. at 587.
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'brought against him.85 Thus, where there is no
formal accusation, "the State may proceed me-
thodically to build its case while the prospec-
tive defendant proceeds to lose his." ,1
Justice White, writing for the majority in
Marion, dealt with the above problem by stat-
ing:
Passage of time, whether before or after
arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence
to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses,
and otherwise interfere with his ability to
defend himself. But this possibility of preju-
dice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to
wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper
context.87
'Under the majority's holding in Marion, then,
the state may formally bring charges against
the accused at any time it wishes, as long as
the applicable statute of limitations has not
run, and still not infringe upon the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial 8
Responding to the majority in Marion, Jus-
tice Douglas stated that the obligation which
the sixth amendment "places on Government
officials to proceed expeditiously with criminal
prosecutions would have little meaning if those
officials could determine when that duty was to
commence." 89 It would also seem that to allow
the state to delay prosecution until a strategi-
cally advantageous time arises undermines the
purposes of both the applicable statute of limi-
tations and the right to a speedy trial.
The purpose of the statute of limitations is
to protect the individual against the bringing
85 Note, The Right to Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 476, 489 (1968).
86 404 U.S. at 331 (Douglas, J., concurring).
87Id. at 321-22. See also United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).
88 Justice White said the remedy for such gov-
ernmental misconduct is to be found in the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. In Marion,
404 U.S. at 324, he observed:
[T]he statute of limitations does not fully de-
fine the appellees' rights 'with respect to the
events occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the
Government concedes that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require
dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at
trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case
caused substantial prejudice to appellees'
rights to a fair trial and that the delay was
an intentional device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused.
89404 U.S. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
of overly stale criminal charges. 90 Thus, the
statute acts as a shield to protect the prospec-
tive defendant. It should not be used, in effect,
to deprive, or at least to limit the scope of, a
defendant's constitutional and statutory rights.
It would be more in accord with the policy un-
derlying the statute of limitations to hold that
the constitutional and statutory right to a
speedy trial attaches from the time that the
state has sufficient evidence to prosecute. The
problem with this approach is that it would
impose difficult problems in determining the
point at which the prosecution has sufficient
evidence to prosecute. At the least, however,
this approach might be used in measuring the
speedy trial time period where there is evi-
dence of prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, where
the state hesitates in bringing charges for no
other reason than to impair the defendant's
ability to defend, the courts ought to measure
the speedy trial time period from the time that
the state could have brought charges. This, in
effect, may be a due process guarantee, but it
amounts to the same thing. Certainly, if there
is both prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice
to the defendant, the state should not be al-
lowed to benefit.
On the other hand, a significant purpose
promoted by the speedy trial right is to pre-
serve the integrity of the fact-finding process.91
In order to uphold the validity of this truth-
finding process, the key issue is whether such
delays impinge upon the trustworthiness of
verdicts and not whether the delays occurred
before arrest or indictment. Since delays oc-
curring before arrest or indictment threaten
the validity of the fact-finding process just as
much as delays occurring after arrest or in-
dictment, the right to a speedy trial should ar-
guably attach as soon as the prosecution has
00 Id. at 322; United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 122 (1966). It might be argued that statutes
of limitations are sufficient to protect an accused
person's right to speedy trial, except that these
statutes establish periods of several years in
length. Obviously, these statutes serve only to set
up the outermost boundaries for prosecutorial inac-
tion, boundaries which cannot be transgressed for
any reason. Within these boundaries, there must
be more restrictive ones, which can be ignored
only for good cause, if the right to speedy trial is
to be fully protected.




sufficient evidence to bring charges against the
defendant.
92
Again, the implementation of the above ap-
proach raises difficult problems. In addition to
the relevant factual problem of determining
when the prosecution has or has had sufficient
evidence, there is the prior problem of deter-
mining what is sufficient evidence. To define
"sufficient evidence" as evidence sufficient to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, or even evidence sufficient to establish
guilt by a preponderance of the evidence, gives
the prosecution an unfair advantage. Under ei-
ther test, the state may always argue that it
has not acquired sufficient evidence and that
the uncertainty of a jury verdict requires the
state to relentlessly pursue the investigation.
In order to combat this problem, sufficient
evidence must be defined as that amount of ev-
idence necessary to establish that "there is
probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the defendant has
committed it . . . . 93 Since probable cause is
sufficient evidence for the state to arrest the
prospective defendant, 94 there is no adequate
reason why the state should not be compelled
to arrest and charge the defendant at that
time. Defining sufficient evidence as evidence
sufficient to show probable cause compels the
state to prosecute at a more readily ascertaina-
ble time. At the same time, such a construction
enables the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
Another difficult problem is determining who
should bear the burden of proving when the
prosecution has sufficient evidence. To expect
the prosecution to maintain a day-by-day ac-
count describing the precise time it acquired
sufficient evidence to prosecute places an intol-
erable burden upon the efficiency of the crimi-
nal justice system.95 For this reason, the de-
fendant should bear the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the state
92 See United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp.
585, 587 (D. Alaska 1970); Penney v. Superior
Court, 28 Cal. App. 3d 941, 105 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1972).
93 FED. R. Caim. P. 4 (emphasis added). The
author has previously argued this standard. Stein-
berg. supra note 75, at 257.
94 Id.
95 See 404 U.S. at 321-22 n.13; Note, Justice
Overdue-Speedy Trial for the Potential Defend-
ant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95. 101-02 n.34 (1952).
had sufficient evidence to prosecute prior to the
date on which charges were formally brought.
This rule will allow the defendant a remedy in
cases of clear prosecutorial misconduct, and at
the same time, it will not burden the prosecu-
torial efforts of the state.
There are certain situations, however, in
which the prosecution justifiably delays in
bringing formal charges against an accused.
Such situations occur when the delay is abso-
lutely necessary to promote the ordinary proc-
esses of justice. A clear example is an under-
cover investigation involving several potential
defendants in which the arrest of one suspect
before a certain strategic time would destroy
the entire investigation. Under such circum-
stances, the state's interest in protecting so-
ciety from crime would justify the delay. 6
Where the delay is not absolutely necessary,
however, the prosecution may justify the delay
only if it can prove that the delay was reason-
ably necessary to promote the ordinary proc-
esses of justice and that the delay did not prej-
udice the accused in the presentation of his
defense.
In order to protect the individual defendant
from prejudicial delay occurring before formal
charges are filed, while, at the same time, pre-
serving society's interest in holding the guilty
accountable for their crimes, it is proposed that
the following three-step test should be em-
ployed to determine when the constitutional
and statutory right to a speedy trial should at-
tach:
(1) The right to a speedy trial attaches, with-
out demand by the accused, from the time the
defendant is arrested, initially arraigned, or
charged, whichever is first;
(2) In order to avoid prosecutorial miscon-
duct, the defendant may prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the state had suffi-
cient evidence to -prosecute him prior to the
date on which charges were formally brought.
If the defendant successfully proves the above,
then the time period attaches from such time
that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to
prosecute;
(3) If the defendant satisfies the conditions of
step two, the state can rebut that attachment if
96 See Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808,
814 (D.C. Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905
(1964) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring).
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it proves by a preponderance of the evidence
(i) that the delay was absolutely necessary to
promote -the ordinary processes of justice or
(ii) that the delay was reasonably necessary
and that it did not prejudice the accused in the
presentation of his defense.97 If the state is
successful in this rebuttal, the time period at-
taches from the time the defendant was ar-
rested, initially arraigned, or charged, which-
ever was first.
It is submitted that this three-step test is an
equitable solution to the right to speedy trial
attachment problem. The test enables the
Speedy Trial Act to better achieve its goal of
"reducing crime and the danger of recidivism"
in this country. 8 The test also recognizes the
speedy trial right, in practice as well as in
theory, as a fundamental right provided for by
the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 was enacted
in order to insure both the defendant's and so-
ciety's interests in having speedy trials. By
providing that the time period does not attach
until the accused is arrested or served with a
summons, however, the Act permits the Govern-
ment to take such action at any convenient
time within the applicable statute of limita-
tions. Although the defendant can prove a de-
97 See generally Nickens v. United States, 323
F.2d 808, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 905 (1964) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring) ;
Williams v. United States, 250 F2d 19, 21 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) ; Wilson v. State, 8 Md. App. 299, 311-
12, 259 A.2d 553, 560 (1969). Where a delay is
absolutely necessary to further the ordinary proc-
esses of justice, society's interest in holding the
guilty accountable for their crimes must be given
preference over any possible prejudice to an accused.
It must be emphasized that in such a situation, the
government's standard for justifying the delay is
extremely high. The state must prove that the delay
was not only reasonably necessary, but absolutely
necessary. If the government can only show that
the delay was reasonably justified, then it must also
prove that the delay did not prejudice the defendant
in the presentation of his case.
98 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161.
nial of due process by showing that the state's
delay was intentional and greatly prejudiced
him in the presentation of his defense,99 the
fact is that the above allegations are extremely
difficult to substantiate. In practical effect, then,
the Act gives the Government its option to ar-
rest the accused at the correct time or to delay
in order that it may methodically "build its
case." 100
It is submitted that the proper solution to
this problem will be implemented by the enact-
ment of the following proposed statute:
The time for trial shall attach, without
demand by the accused, from the time the
defendant is arrested, from the time of his ini-
tial arraignment, or from the time the charge
is placed against the accused, whichever is
first. If, however, the defendant should prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
state had sufficient evidence (i.e. probable
cause) to prosecute him prior to the date on
which charges were formally brought, then the
time period shall attach when the prosecution
had sufficient evidence (i.e. probable cause) to
prosecute unless the state should prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
delay was absolutely necessary to promote the
ordinary processes of justice or that (2) the
delay was reasonably necessary and that it did
not prejudice the accused in the presentation
of his defense10
The above proposal adequately protects the
individual defendant from prejudicial delays
which may occur prior to the filing of formal
charges. At the same time, it also preserves so-
ciety's interest in bringing potentially guilty
defendants promptly to trial. Thus, the pro-
posed statute provides a proper balance be-
tween the interests of society and the rights of
the accused. It should therefore be legislatively
adopted.1
02
99 404 U.S. at 324.
100 Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101 See Steinberg, supra note 75, at 259, 260.
102 Id.
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